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 1 Introduction
The Correspondence Principle introduced by Paul Samuelson over 60 years
ago, see (Samuelson 1941) and (Samuelson 1942), became a standard tool
in the 1950’s and 60’s in comparative statics analysis in both micro- and
macroeconomic theory. The applications have ranged from Walrasian sta-
bility analysis in general equilibrium theory, stability of macroeconomic sys-
tems, deterministic dynamic optimization models and international trade.1
Samuelson suggested that there is a mutually supportive relationship be-
tween the stability of an equilibrium and its comparative statics. The form
of the relationship is open to varying interpretations and consequently the
usefulness of Samuelson’s correspondence principle has been widely debated,
see e.g. the skeptical conclusions in the context of general equilibrium theory
and stability of Walrasian tatonnêment in (Quirk and Saposnik 1968) and
(Arrow and Hahn 1971).
With the advent of stochastic rational expectations (RE) models this
classic technique fell into disuse in dynamic equilibrium theory. Our goal in
this paper is to resuscitate key ideas behind Samuelson’s principle in a way
that makes them applicable to dynamic stochastic expectations models.
For stochastic expectations models the appropriate concept of equilib-
rium is usually taken to be the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). We
will mainly focus on REE, but our argument applies also to “restricted per-
ceptions equilibria,” a weakening of rational expectations to set-ups in which
agents use misspeciﬁed models.2 We introduce the E- (or Expectational)
correspondence principle, by which it is possible to study, without explicit
solution of the equilibrium, how properties of a stable equilibrium are aﬀected
by changes in the structural parameters of the model. The E-correspondence
principle can be applied to analyze comparative dynamic properties of REE
that are stable under adaptive learning.3
The theory of stability under adaptive learning is a concept of stability
1There is a very large literature in these diﬀerent areas see e.g. (Samuelson 1947),
(Patinkin 1965) and (Quirk and Saposnik 1968) for general equilibrium theory and macro-
economics, (Mortensen 1973), (Burmeister and Long 1977) and (Brock and Malliaris 1989)
for dynamic optimization models and (Neary 1978) for international trade.
2See the example at the end of Section 3.1.
3Recently, (Echenique 2002) has exploited has exploited Samuelson’s correspondence
principle in abstract games of strategic complementarities and adaptive dynamics to select
among multiple equilibria and to derive comparative static results for such games.
1for REE that operates in real time and has been widely studied in the re-
cent literature.4 A basic result in this literature is the E- (or Expectational)
stability principle according to which, for a very wide variety of models,
stability of an equilibrium, under least squares and closely related learn-
ing schemes, is equivalent to E-stability of the equilibrium. See (Evans and
Honkapohja 2001) for a detailed discussion of the E-stability concept and the
models and adaptive learning rules to which it applies. E-stability is deﬁned
in virtual or notional time using an ordinary diﬀerential equation that is as-
sociated with the stochastic dynamics of learning. The use of a diﬀerential
equation system describing adjustment dynamics out of equilibrium was a
central characteristic in the stability analysis of Walrasian tatonnêment in
classic general equilibrium theory and in the dynamics of traditional macro-
economic models, see the references in footnote 1. This feature makes it
possible to develop the E-correspondence principle for stochastic models.
Broadly speaking, the E-correspondence principle states that E-stability
of a dynamic equilibrium implies useful sign restrictions when local compar-
ative dynamic properties of the equilibrium are studied. This study is based
on the implicit function theorem operating in the parameter spaces of the
model and the parameters of the equilibrium stochastic process. This formu-
lation is analogous to a form of Samuelson’s classic Correspondence Principle,
which derived sign restrictions from stability under Walrasian tatonnêment
or related dynamics of model variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst develops a simple exam-
ple of a standard rational expectations model and REE. This facilitates the
formulation of an abstract framework for the E-correspondence principle op-
erating in the spaces of the structural model parameters and the parameters
of the equilibrium process. Section 3 contains several economic applications.
Section 4 develops a quantitative version of the E-correspondence principle
that can be applied when qualitative results are ambiguous. Section 5 con-
cludes.
4(Evans and Honkapohja 2001) is a treatise on the analysis of adaptive learning and its
implications in macroeconomics. (Evans and Honkapohja 1999), (Evans and Honkapohja
1995), (Marimon 1997), (Sargent 1993) and (Sargent 1999) provide surveys of the ﬁeld.
22 The General Framework
We explain and illustrate the concept of E-stability using an example of a
standard linear expectations model, and then give a general formulation.
2.1 Example 1: A Linear RE Model
There is a single endogenous variable yt that depends linearly on the ex-
pectations of its value next period E∗
tyt+1 and it lagged value yt−1 and an
exogenous shock vt that is taken to be iid with zero mean for simplicity.
Thus the model is
yt = α + βE
∗
tyt+1 + δyt−1 + γvt. (1)
We introduce a multiplying constant γ to the shock, which is convenient for
studying the eﬀects of an increase in the variance of the shock. Here E∗
t(.)
denotes possibly nonrational expectations, and RE are denoted by Et(.).
We need to use E∗
t(.) because the E-stability concept is deﬁned in terms of
disequilibrium learning dynamics. This also allows us to consider restricted
perceptions equilibria as well as REE.
To compute REE, conjecture that they take the AR(1) form
yt = a + byt−1 + cvt, (2)
where a, b and c are unknown constants that can be determined as solu-
tions to a set of equations given below. As is usual, we restrict attention to
stationary stochastic solutions, i.e. solutions with |b| < 1.
In adaptive learning it is assumed that agents guess that the stochastic
process for the endogenous variables has the form (2) but do not know the
equilibrium values of the parameters a, b and c. Agents try to estimate the
values of a, b and c using past data and a standard statistical technique
such as least squares. At each moment of time the agents are assumed to
forecast the value of yt+1 using their estimated model. These parameter
estimates together with yt−1 and vt are used to calculate E∗
tyt+1 and (1) then
determines the “temporary equilibrium” value of yt. An REE is said to stable
under learning if agents’ estimates of a,b,c converge over time to the REE
values.
The key result for least squares learning is that estimated values of the
parameters a, b and c locally converge to REE values if and only if the REE
3is E-stable. The deﬁnition of E-stability is based on a mapping from the
(possibly non-rational) perceived law of motion (PLM) parameters to the
actual law of motion (ALM) parameters that these perceptions.
The formal deﬁnition of E-stability for model (1) is as follows. Assuming
that the current value of the endogenous variable is not known, while the
current value of the exogenous variable is known, at the time when agents
make forecasts,5 we have
E
∗
tyt+1 = a(1 + b)+b
2yt−1 + bcvt
for any given values a,b,c. Inserting this forecast into (1) yields the ALM,
w h i c hi st h u sg i v e nb y
yt = α + βa(1 + b)+( βb
2 + δ)yt−1 +( βbc+ γ)vt.
This speciﬁes the mapping (a,b,c) → T(a,b,c) from the PLM to the ALM,
where
T(a,b,c)=( α + βa(1 + b),βb
2 + δ,βbc+ γ).
An REE of the form (2) is a ﬁxed point (a,b,c) of T, i.e. a solution to
the equation
(a,b,c)=T(a,b,c),
and it is easily seen that there are two (or zero) REE of this form. A ﬁxed
point is said to be E-stable if it is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium
point of the ordinary diﬀerential equation
d(a,b,c)
dτ
= T(a,b,c) − (a,b,c),
in which a,b,c are now treated as functions of τ, denoting notional or virtual
time. By diﬀerentiation it is easily seen that a ﬁxed point (a,b,c) is E-stable
if and only if all the eigenvalues of DT − I have negative real parts.6
Assuming the parameters β,δ a r es u c ht h a tr e a ls o l u t i o n se x i s to ft h e
form (2), either one or both of the solutions can be stochastically stationary.
However, if both solutions are stationary then only one of the solutions will
be E-stable, i.e. stable under least squares learning.7 The E-correspondence
5This assumption is often made in the literature. It is also possible to allow for full
contemporaneous data or only lagged data in the formation of expectations E∗
t (.).
6Throughout we assume that the relevant eigenvalues do not have zero real parts.
7However, in more elaborate linear models there can be multiple stationary E-stable
solutions.
4principle provides information on the comparative dynamics of solutions that
are stable under least-squares learning (or any learning rule whose stability
properties are governed by E-stability).
2.2 General Formulation
Example 1 illustrates that for many expectations models relevant equilibria
can be computed from an equation in the space of parameters characterizing
the equilibrium process, which is the space of (a,b,c) in Example 1. The
model itself is usually dependent on a ﬁnite set of structural parameters,
which in Example 1 are (α,β,δ,γ). We now develop this in an abstract
setting.
Denote the equilibrium process parameters by Θ and the structural pa-
rameters by Φ. Θ is assumed to be an n−dimensional vector Θ ∈ Rn and
Φ is m−dimensional, i.e. Φ ∈ Rm. We also assume that there is a mapping
from the PLM, which is parametrized by Θ, to the ALM and we denote this
mapping by T(Θ). For given values of Φ, the relevant equilibria are given by
the equation
T(Θ,Φ) = Θ, (3)
w h e r ew eh a v em a d ee x p l i c i tt h ed e p e n d e n c eo ft h eT mapping on the struc-
tural parameters Φ. E-stability is deﬁned by the local asymptotic dynamics
of the diﬀerential equation
dΘ
dτ
= T(Θ,Φ) − Θ,
where Φ is kept ﬁxed.
The E-stability condition is that all n eigenvalues of the matrix D1T(Θ,Φ)−
I have negative real parts at the equilibrium of interest. When D1T(Θ,Φ)−I
is non-singular we can use the implicit function theorem. A small change in
Φ deﬁnes through the equation (3) a function Θ=F(Φ) describing in the
parameter space Rn how the equilibrium shifts as a result of the change in
Φ. Moreover, this function is diﬀerentiable when T(Θ,Φ) is continuously
diﬀerentiable, see e.g. (Simon and Blume 1994). Taking diﬀerentials of (3),
we have
(D1T − I)dΘ+D2TdΦ=0 (4)
and the partial derivatives
∂Fi









∆=d e t ( D1T − I)
and ∆ij is obtained from ∆ by replacing its i’th column by the j’th column
of D2T, see e.g. (Simon and Blume 1994).
The following lemma is the key to the E-correspondence principle:
Lemma 1 If the equilibrium of interest is E-stable, then sgn(∆) = sgn(−1)n,
where n is the dimension of Θ.
Proof. ∆ is equal to the product of the eigenvalues of D1T − I.I ft h e
eigenvalues of D1T −I are all real, the result follows at once. If D1T −I has
any complex eigenvalues, they appear in conjugate pairs and their product
is positive.
On the basis of Lemma 1 we can always sign the denominator in (5) when
the equilibrium of interest is E-stable. This allows us to state:
Theorem 2 (The E-correspondence principle) If the equilibrium deﬁned by
the equation T(Θ,Φ) = Θ is E-stable and the parameter Φj undergoes a small








n sgn(∆ij), i =1 ,...,n. (6)
The proof is immediate from the preceding considerations. Note that a
similar result fails for equilibria that are not E-stable since, for example, the
determinant ∆ cannot then in general be signed.
3 Economic Applications
We ﬁrst continue the analysis of comparative dynamics of the linear model
in Example 1 and then develop two further examples.
63.1 Example 1, Continued
F o rt h el i n e a rm o d e l( 1 )w eh a v eΘ=( a,b,c), Φ=( α,β,δ,γ) and the
equations deﬁning the equilibrium are
(a,b,c)=( α + βa(1 + b),βb
2 + δ,βbc+ γ).
In this case
D1T − I =


β(1 + b) − 1 βa 0
02 βb− 10
0 βc βb− 1

,
and by E-stability sgn(∆) = sgn(det(D1T − I)) = −1. Furthermore, E-
stability also implies that β(1 + b) − 1, 2βb− 1 and βb− 1 are all negative
at an E-stable REE.
For the eﬀects of changes in the structural parameters one can now easily
compute the following results.












0 βc βb− 1






−1(2βb− 1)(βb− 1) > 0,
in other words a shift in the constant α shifts up the constant of an E-stable
REE process. Similarly, we have ∂b
∂α = ∂c
∂α =0 ,s ot h a tas h i f ti nα does not
inﬂuence the coeﬃcients of yt−1 and vt of the (E-stable) REE process.
(2) For the eﬀects of a change in the coeﬃcient of the expectations term β




−1(β(1 + b) − 1)b
2(βb− 1) > 0.
In particular, for the case β>0 and b>0 we have the important result that
a higher weight on future expectations in the structural model leads to higher
persistence in an E-stable REE. The other eﬀects ∂a
∂β, ∂c
∂β are ambiguous unless
further assumptions are made.




−1(β(1 + b) − 1)(βb− 1) > 0.
7For δ>0 and b>0, a higher weight on the lagged value of the endogenous
variable in the structural model leads to higher persistence in an E-stable
REE. The other eﬀects ∂a
∂δ, ∂c
∂δ are in general ambiguous.













1−b2 , this implies that an increase in γ increases var(yt)
when c>0. Changes in γ do not inﬂuence the parameters a and b.
The above analysis has restricted attention to REE that are stable under
the learning dynamics. However it is also possible to use the E-correspondence
principle to examine the comparative dynamics of “restricted perceptions
equilibria” (RPE) in which agents are boundedly rational in the sense that
they use the optimal choice of models from within a misspeciﬁed class.8 A
very simple example is based on Example 1. Suppose that agents underpara-
meterize the law of motion in (1) by omitting the lagged dependent variable.
Their PLM then takes the very simple form yt = a + εt, where agents are
(incorrectly) assuming that εt is white noise. Under this PLM expectations
are given by E∗
tyt+1 = a and the ALM is given by yt = α+βa+δyt−1+vt.I n
the case of RPE, E-stability is deﬁned in terms of the mapping from the PLM
to the “projected ALM,” i.e. to the corresponding minimum mean square
error forecasting model within the class of PLMs. Provided |δ| < 1 so that





The RPE is determined by the ﬁxed point of the T-map,
a =
α
1 − β − δ
,
so that in the RPE
yt =( 1− β − δ)
−1α(1 − δ)+δyt−1 + vt.
8RPE are discussed in Chapter 13 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). (Sargent 1999)
uses the closely related concept of a self conﬁrming equilibrium.
8The corresponding E-stability condition T (a) < 1, evaluated at the ﬁxed
point, is given by (1 − δ)−1β<1,w h i c h ,u s i n g|δ| < 1, is equivalent to
β + δ<1. This has immediate implications for the eﬀect on the sample





We have developed this example, of the application of the E-correspondence
principle to an RPE, for a very simple case, but it would be easy to de-
velop a more elaborate example. For example, suppose (1) were augmented
to include a vector of observable exogenous shocks following a stationary
ﬁrst-order vector autoregression. In the REE the PLM would include all of
these variables as well as the intercept and yt−1. Boundedly rational agents
might omit either yt−1 or some of the exogenous observables and the E-
correspondence principle could be used to investigate the resulting RPE.
The ﬁndings of our ﬁrst example are three-fold. First, we see that the E-
correspondence principle in many cases yields important qualitative results
on the comparative dynamics of E-stable REE. These include eﬀects of para-
meter changes on the mean, variance and persistence properties of the REE.
Second, E-stability is not always suﬃcient to give unambiguous qualitative
results. This is a point to which we will return in Section 4. Third, the
use of the E-correspondence principle is not restricted to examination of the
comparative dynamics properties of REE. If agents in the model are bound-
edly rational and use the best model within a misspeciﬁed class of PLMs,
the E-correspondence principle can provide qualitative information on the
comparative dynamics properties of the RPE.
3.2 Example 2: Sunspot Equilibria
We consider a standard one-step forward-looking nonlinear model
xt = EtF(xt+1), (7)
which is known to have diﬀerent types of REE, depending on the shape of
the F(.) function. xt is a scalar endogenous variable and its value in period t
depends on the forecasts of a nonlinear function of its value next period. The
9equilibria for the model can include steady states, perfect foresight cycles and
sunspot equilibria.9
A widely studied case of a sunspot solution has the form of 2−state
Markov chain. Suppose st ∈{ 1,2} is a two-state Markov chain with time-
invariant transition probabilities πij =P r {st+1 = j |st = i}.T h e M a r k o v
chain induces, via expectations, an REE {x1,x 2} that is also a Markov chain
with the same transition probabilities. Thus, for all t, the REE satisﬁes
xt = xi = πiiF(xi)+( 1− πij)F(xj) if st = i.
A( 2−state) Markov sunspot equilibrium (SSE) with transition probabilities
{π11,π 22} is thus a pair {x1,x 2} of distinct values for the state variable that
satisfy the equations
π11F(x1)+( 1− π11)F(x2) − x1 =0 , (8)
(1 − π22)F(x1)+π22F(x2) − x2 =0 . (9)
We will assume that x1 >x 2, without loss of generality.
Using an overlapping generations model, (Woodford 1990) showed that
the economy can in some cases converge to an SSE through adaptive learning.
(Evans and Honkapohja 1994) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) derived
local stability conditions for adaptive learning for model (7) and showed that
these conditions are in turn given by E-stability arguments. Moreover, they
showed how stability of SSEs suﬃciently near non-stochastic solutions can
be obtained from the stability properties of the non-stochastic equilibria.
In this paper we employ the E-correspondence principle to derive the
following comparative dynamics result for Markov SSE’s with respect to a
variation in the transition probabilities of the sunspot:
Proposition 3 Suppose x1 >x 2 and that F  (xi) < 1,i=1 ,2.C o n s i d e ra n





=s g n [ F(x1) −
F(x2)].
Proof. The E-stability condition is obtained from the mapping from the











9See (Guesnerie and Woodford 1992) for a thorough discussion.
10and the stability condition is that the eigenvalues of the matrix
DT − I =
 
π11F  (x1) − 1( 1 − π11)F  (x2)
(1 − π22)F (x1) π22F  (x2) − 1
 
have negative real parts.
Turning to the comparative dynamics, we diﬀerentiate (8)-(9) and obtain
the system
 
π11F  (x1) − 1( 1 − π11)F  (x2)




















= −sgn[(F(x1) − F(x2))(π22F
 (x2) − 1)]







= −sgn[(F(x2) − F(x1))(π11F
 (x1) − 1)] =
−sgn[F(x1) − F(x2)]
since the system is two-dimensional and thus
det
 
π11F  (x1) − 1( 1 − π11)F  (x2)
(1 − π22)F (x1) π22F  (x2) − 1
 
> 0
if the SSE is E-stable.
This result can be given a precise interpretation in two speciﬁc cases.
(1) If the mapping F(x) is strictly decreasing, then the amplitude of the
sunspot ﬂuctuations is reduced by an increase in the probability of the econ-
omy of staying in the high state. This case arises, for example, in the
case of E-stable SSE’s suﬃciently near a single steady state. (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b) show that E-stable SSE’s exist near a single steady state
ˆ x = F(ˆ x) provided F  (ˆ x) < −1 at the steady state ˆ x.
11(2) If the mapping F(x) is strictly increasing, there may exist two distinct
steady states ˆ x1, ˆ x2 and if F  (ˆ x1),F (ˆ x2) < 1, then there exist E-stable SSE’s
for which sunspot states are near ˆ x1, ˆ x2, see (Evans and Honkapohja 1994)
and Section 4.6 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). Two-state Markov SSE’s
suﬃciently near ˆ x1, ˆ x2 must satisfy the derivative condition of Proposition 3
and F(x1) >F (x2), so that in this case the amplitude of the sunspot ﬂuc-
tuation is increased by an increase in the probability of the economy staying
at the high state x1.
3.3 Example 3: Monetary Policy in the New Keyne-
sian Model
As a third example of the usefulness of the E-correspondence principle we
consider a bivariate linear model, the New Keynesian model of monetary
policy, which takes the form






πt = cπ + κzt + BE
∗
tπt+1. (11)
Here zt is the output gap, πt is the inﬂation rate and rt is the nominal interest
rate. The parameters σ,κ > 0 and 0 < B < 1. cz and cπ are intercepts, which
are from the log-linearization of the exact model. gt is an observable shock to
the output gap. The stochastic process for gt will be speciﬁed below. (Here
we focus on the one-shock case that is often employed.) The ﬁrst equation
is the IS curve that comes from the Euler equation for consumer optimality
and the second equation is the forward-looking Phillips curve based on Calvo
price stickiness. This model is widely used in current discussions of monetary
policy. See e.g. (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), (Svensson 2003) and
(Woodford 2003) for details and analysis.
The model is completed by speciﬁcation of an interest rate rule. A wide
variety of diﬀerent rules have been studied in the literature. The issue of
stability under learning has been examined by (Bullard and Mitra 2002),
(Evans and Honkapohja 2003c) and several other papers. For a review of the
literature see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a). For concreteness, we consider
interest rate setting by a forward-looking Taylor rule





12where cr denotes an intercept. The parameters satisfy ϕπ,ϕ z > 0.W e a r e
interested in examining how changes in these policy parameters aﬀect the
volatilities of the output gap and inﬂation, as measured by the variances.
Introducing the notation yt =( zt,π t) , equations (10), (11) and (12) can
be combined to yield the bivariate system
yt = A + ME
∗
tyt+1 + Pgt,
gt = ρgt−1 + εt,
where |ρ| < 1 and εt is white noise with variance σ2




1 − σ−1ϕz σ−1(1 − ϕπ)








Section 3.3 of (Bullard and Mitra 2002) discusses in detail the determinacy
and E-stability conditions. There is a unique solution of the form
yt = a + hgt,
where a and h are 2×1 vectors. The mapping from the PLM to the ALM is
Ta(a)=A + Ma,
Th(h)=ρMh + P
and the ﬁxed point a = Ta(a), h = Th(h) deﬁnes the REE values of the
coeﬃcients a and h. The E-stability conditions for this solution are that the
real parts of the eigenvalues of the matrices M −I and ρM −I are negative.
We now turn to the comparative dynamics, focusing on the derivatives
∂|hi|
∂ϕj ,i=1 ,2;j = z,π, i.e. whether more aggressive policy response to either
output gap or inﬂation increases or decreases the magnitude of the response of
output gap and inﬂation to the shock gt. Taking diﬀerentials of the equation
h = ρMh + P we get
dh = ρ(Mdh+( dM)h)
or
(I − ρM)dh = ρ
∂M
∂ϕj
hdϕj, j = z,π,
13where
I − ρM =
 
σ−1ϕzρ +1− ρ −ρσ−1(1 − ϕπ)




































   
 
1 −ρσ−1(1 − ϕπ)
κ 1 − ρ(B + κσ−1(1 − ϕπ))
 




























spectively, and thus the formal results can be summarized as:
Proposition 4 More aggressive interest rate policy dϕπ > 0,dϕ z > 0 de-
creases the variances of the output gap and inﬂation.
4 A Quantitative Version
The preceding examples have shown that the E-correspondence principle can
be used to obtain useful results for comparative dynamics. However, even
14in Example 1 we noted that the qualitative eﬀects were ambiguous for some
aspects of comparative dynamics. In other words, E-stability conditions are
not always suﬃcient to pin down the signs of parameter changes. We will
discuss this limitation further in the concluding section. In this section we
consider a more complicated example to illustrate that E-stability can be used
numerically to derive quantitative comparative dynamics results in cases in
which qualitative results are not available.
Example 4:
Consider the monetary model of Example 3 but with a diﬀerent interest
rate rule, known as the lagged-data Taylor rule
rt = ar + ϕππt−1 + ϕzzt−1.
The reduced form is now
yt = A + ME
∗
tyt+1 + Nyt−1 + Pgt,


















We consider the REEs of the form
yt = a + byt−1 + cgt,
and the mapping from the PLM to the ALM is








where T =( Ta,T b,T c).
15It can be veriﬁed that E-stability conditions are insuﬃcient to provide
unambiguous qualitative comparative dynamics. An example will be given
below. However, it is still possible to use E-stability diﬀerential equations to
compute numerically comparative dynamics results.
We introduce two calibrations for the New Keynesian model suggested
by (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) and (Woodford 1999), respectively.
CGG: B =0 .99, σ =1 , κ =0 .3;
W: B =0 .99, σ =0 .157, κ =0 .024.
We also set ρ =0 .35 and σ2
g =0 .02. Our interest is in the eﬀects of changes
in the policy rule parameters ϕπ and ϕz on the asymptotic variances of the
output gap and inﬂation, which are aﬀected by b and c. We calculate the
values of b and c using the E-stability diﬀerential equations. For example,
for ϕπ =1 .5 and ϕz =0 .15 and the CGG calibration we calculate the
equilibrium values of b and c using a numerical diﬀerential equation solver in












The variances of zt and πt can be computed from the linear equations
Va r(yt)=b(Va r(yt))b




This provides an eﬃcient way of computing the solution and its properties
and can obviously be used to compute comparative dynamics numerically for
global as well as local changes in exogenous parameters. As an illustration
we consider the eﬀects of changes in ϕπ and ϕz on var(zt) and var(πt) for
the CGG and W calibrations of the model with lagged Taylor rule. Table 1
gives the results when either ϕπ or ϕz is increased from the base line.11
CGG
ϕπ,ϕ z 1.5,0.15 1.5,0.20 1.75,0.15
var(zt) 0.02108 0.02053 0.02014
var(πt) 0.001871 0.001751 0.001670
10The REE is only locally stable, but the basin of attraction appears to be quite large.
11Alternatively, the appropriate partial derivatives could be numerically evaluated once
the REE has been computed using E-stability ODEs.
16W
ϕπ,ϕ z 1.5,0.15 1.5,0.20 1.75,0.15
var(zt) 0.80125 0.9515 0.8050
var(πt) 0.000284 0.0002597 0.0002771
Table 1: Output gap and inﬂation variances
We note that, in the case of the CGG calibration, increases in either ϕπ
or ϕz reduce both variances, whereas in the W calibration the variance of the
output gap increases while the variance of inﬂation decreases. This shows
that the qualitative comparative dynamics are ambiguous.
Clearly, there exist alternative methods of computing how the equilibrium
shifts as a result of a parameter change. However, the application of the
E-stability diﬀerential equation ensures that attention is directed only at E-
stable REE. In this sense the computation relies on the E-correspondence
principle.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have introduced the E-correspondence principle and shown that it can
be exploited to obtain useful comparative dynamic results for stable ratio-
nal expectations solutions in dynamic stochastic expectations models. The
E-correspondence principle can also be applied to stable restricted percep-
tions equilibria in which the rationality concept is weakened. In the E-
correspondence principle the stability criterion is that of real-time least squares
learning and is governed by associated E-stability conditions. Our principle
is motivated by Samuelson’s classic correspondence principle, which was ap-
plied to comparative statics in nonstochastic models. Naturally, it would be
possible to exploit Samuelson’s ideas for other forms of learning dynamics,
for example eductive learning, which is reviewed in (Guesnerie 2002) and
(Evans 2001). Another example already noted above is (Echenique 2002),
which studied abstract games of strategic complementarity with adaptive
dynamics.
Samuelson’s principle was often criticized in the subsequent literature.
For example, in the context of classic general equilibrium theory (Arrow and
Hahn 1971), p.321 conclude that “the necessary conditions for local stability
17are too weak for the comparison task.” However, our analysis demonstrates
that the E-correspondence principle can indeed provide important qualita-
tive comparative dynamic results in a number of concrete models. Example 2
shows how the amplitude of sunspot ﬂuctuations depends on transition prob-
abilities for E-stable sunspot equilibria. In Example 3 we derive qualitative
results on how output gap and inﬂation volatilities depend on the parameters
of the interest rate rule.
Clearly, the E-correspondence principle does not always yield unambigu-
ous qualitative comparative dynamic results. This was illustrated in parts of
Example 1 as well as in Example 4. At the same time, Example 4 illustrates
how a quantitative version of the E-correspondence principle can be applied
using a computer and standard numerical techniques for ordinary diﬀerential
equations that were unavailable at the time Samuelson introduced his classic
concept.
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